A good friend of mine has, for many years, said “Don’t let the facts get in the way of a good story.” She has led a very interesting life and has thousands of funny anecdotes, but is known to embellish a bit. She always describes real life events, but uses some imagination and injects a few spurious details to spice things up a little bit. Not false statements, but tweaking the facts to make a more engaging story. Several of the comments on the blog in regards to our series on Database Encryption, as well as some of those made during product briefings, fall into the later category. Not completely false, but true only from a limited perspective, so I am calling them ‘fiction’.

It’s ironic that I am working on a piece called “Truth, Lies, and Fiction in Encryption” that will be published later this summer or early fall. I am getting a lot of good material that will go into that project, but there are a couple fictional claims that I want to raise in this series to highlight some of the benefits, weaknesses, and practical realities that come into play with database encryption.

One of the private comments made in response to Part 4: Credentialed User protection was: “Remember that in both cases (Re: general users and database administrators), encryption is worthless if an authorized user account itself is compromised.” I classify this as fiction because it is not totally correct. Why? I can compromise a database account, let’s say the account that an application uses to connect to the database. But that does not mean I have credentials to obtain the key to decrypt data. I have to compromise both the database and the key/application user credentials for this.

For example, when I create a key in Microsoft SQL Server, I protect that key with a password or encrypt it with a different key. MSDN shows the SQL Server calls. If someone compromises the database account “SAP_Conn_Pool_User” with the password “Password1”, they still have not obtained the decryption keys. You still need to supply a password as a parameter to the ‘EncryptByKey’ or ‘DecryptByKey’ commands. A hacker would need to guess the password or gain access to the key that has encrypted the user’s key. But with connection pooling, there will be many users keys passed in context of the query operations, meaning that the hacker must compromise several keys before the correct one is obtained. A DBA can gain access to this key if internal to the database, and I believe can intercept it if the value is passed through the database to an external HSM via database API (I say ‘believe’ because I have not personally written exploit code to do so). With the latest release of SQL Server, you can segregate the DBA role to limit access to stored key data, but not eliminate it altogether.

Another example: With IBM DB2, the user connection to the database is one set of credentials, while access to encryption keys uses a second set of credentials. To gain access you need to gain both sets. Here is a reference for Encrypting Data Values in DB2 Universal Database.

Where this statement is true is with Transparent Encryption, such as the various derivatives of Oracle Transparent Encryption. Once a database user is validated to the database, the user session is supplied with an encryption key, and encryption operations are automatically mapped to the issued queries, thus the user automatically has access to the table that stores the key and does not need to credentials for access. Transparent Encryption from all vendors will be similar. You can use the API of the DBMS_Crypto package to provide this additional layer of protection, but like the rest of the platforms, you must separate the implicit binding of database user to encryption key, and this means altering your program to some degree. As with SQL Server, an Oracle DBA may or may not be able to obtain keys based upon a segregated DBA role.

We have also received a comment on the blog that stated “encrypting data in any layer but the application layer leaves your data insecure.” Once again, a bit of fiction. If you view the problem as protecting data when database accounts have been compromised, then this is a true statement. Encryption credentials in the application layer are safe. But applications provide application users the same type of transparency that Transparent Encryption provides database users, thus a breached application account will also bypass encryption credentials and access some portion of the data stored in the database. Same problem, different layer.

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