The NFL lockout is over. Hallelujah! I know nothing substantial was really lost, besides the Hall of Fame game, but the folly of billionaires bickering with millionaires annoyed pretty much everyone. I believe more folks were hanging on this negotiation than the crap going on in Washington over the debt ceiling. It seemed like a tug of war gone wild, with both sides digging in. Until they finally reached a critical point, when real money was at stake, and amazingly the deal got done. What’s…
I know we all have compliance fatigue. Some worse than others, but we all rue the day security became more about compliance and getting the rubber stamp than actually protecting something. The pragmatist in me continues to accept our lot in life and try to be somewhat optimistic about it. But at the end of the day, we (as an industry) pretty much suck at protecting things, and there are no real catalysts to change that.
I usually agree with Jack Daniel. You know, we curmudgeons need to stick together. But one of the requirements of membership in the Curmudgeons Association is to call crap when we see it. And much as it pains me to say it, Jack’s latest rant on InfoSec’s misunderstanding of business is crap.
Oracle purchased Secerno 14 months ago. It was advertised as a database firewall to block malicious queries and certain types of attacks. What they have presented looks like a plausible method of protecting databases once an attack is known but before the patch is applied. And as we know many Oracle shops don’t apply security (or any) patches on a quarterly basis. They may patch on a yearly basis. Secerno looks like a temporary fix to help these companies.
I talk a lot on Twitter about my password manager. I use 1Password and love it. It auto-generates random passwords for me of any length I choose, auto-fills web forms for me, and remembers both the web page and the hideously complex password I have chosen. It automatically synchronizes across all my computers so I am never without all my current passwords. The file is encrypted with AES-128 and they handle encryption keys securely, so I believe the product is pretty secure. Now, rather than…
I imagine with this heat wave covering most the country you’re likely on your way to the beach – or at least some place better than work. So with me traveling, Mike suffering through physical therapy, and Rich spending time with the family, this week’s summary will be a short one.
The Freakonomics blog assembled an interesting quorum on security. Industry heavyweights like Schneier weighed in on the following question:
Why has there been such a spike in hacking recently? Or is it merely a function of us playing closer attention and of institutions being more open about reporting security breaches?
Something didn’t add up. We got a call from the girl’s camp literally 3 days after they got there saying XX2 needed more stationery. We hoped this meant she was a prolific writer, and we’d be getting a couple updates a week. Almost 3 weeks later, we got 1 postcard. That’s it. A few of her friends got letters, but not nearly enough to have depleted her stash of letters/postcards. And the longer we went without a letter, the more ornery The Boss got.
As far back as I can remember, I have been a fan of testing your defenses. Some people call it pen testing, others refer to it as an assurance process, but the point is the same either way. The bad folks test your defenses every day, and if you aren’t using the same tactics to find out what they can get, you’re going to have a bad day. Maybe not today, maybe not even tomorrow. But the clock is ticking.
Matt Miller, Tim Burrell, and Michael Howard from the Microsoft Security Engineering Center published a paper last week on Mitigating Software vulnerabilities. In a nutshell, they advocate a set of tactics that limit – or outright block – known and emerging attack techniques. Rather than play catch-up and patch the threat du jour, they outline use cases for the technologies that Microsoft employs within their own products to make it much harder to compromise code with canned attacks.